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Abstract
The EPR paradox and the meaning of the Bell inequality are discussed.
It is shown that considering the quantum objects as carrying with them
”instruction kits” telling them what to do when meeting a measurement
apparatus any paradox disappears. In this view the quantum state is char-
acterized by the prescribed behaviour rather than by the specific value a
parameter assumes as a result of an interaction.
1. Introduction
A famous paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [1] appeared in 1935 in the
Physical Review gave rise to a live debate on the meaning and the foundation
of quantum mechanics, lasting up to our days. Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen
(EPR) pointed out that something must be missing in the quantum theory because
applying it to a thought experiment they analysed, led to a paradox or at least to
a contradiction with the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Three decades later, J.
Bell proved his celebrated inequality [2] and applying it to the EPR experiment
concluded that in some cases quantum mechanics violates it and that its violation
would imply a break down either of the principle of reality or of the principle
of locality (provided one would not be inclined to give up causality). Different
variants of the EPR experiment have been considered such as the one proposed
by Bohm [3] using pairs of spin 1/2 particles prepared in a singlet state. Finally
A. Aspect and his group, in the 80’s, actually performed a series of EPR type
experiments measuring the polarization of pairs of photons produced in an SPS
atomic cascade [4]. They verified that the result of the experiments was correctly
predicted by quantum theory and that in some configurations Bell’s inequality
was actually violated.
All this strengthened the idea that quantum mechanics is indeed paradoxical
in character and revived a debate whose ingredients are mainly the supposed non-
locality of quantum phenomena, if not the existence of some sort of superluminal
interaction between distant quantum objects.
Now what is rather surprising in this story is that the so called EPR paradox
appears as being mainly due to a misuse of the Heisenberg principle which should
have been seen since the very beginning. A vague idea of this may be found in
the answer by Bohr [5] to EPR’s paper.
The claim that the paradox was not there and simply was a consequence of an
incorrect application of the rules of probability was first issued by L. Accardi [6]
who developed an axiomatic approach to what he calls quantum probability [7].
In the present paper I shall show why the EPR paradox is not a paradox
and why the result of Aspect’s experiments does not imply any violation of the
principle of locality. In the next section the basic properties of a quantum object or
system are reviewed. In the third section the EPR type experiments are analysed,
then section 4 contains a discussion of the meaning of the Bell inequality; finally
section 5 summarizes the whole paper.
2. Quantum objects
A quantum object is something that can exist in a set of different physical states.
Mathematically these states can be eigenstates of a number of different operators.
Practically the effect of any quantum operator corresponds to the interaction with
a given apparatus which induces the object to enter one of the eigenstates of the
corresponding operator.
We know that operators exist which are mutually incompatible in a sense that
they do not admit common eigenstates. The commutator of two such operators
differs from zero: if ̂A and ̂B are the two operators, applying them in the order ̂A
̂B leaves the system in a state different from the one in which it is left applying
them in the order ̂B ̂A.
All this means that when the system is in an eigenstate of ̂A, the physical
quantity associated to that operator assumes one of its eigenvalues, say a, but the
quantity associated with ̂B is undefined. Conversely, when the system is in an
eigenstate of ̂B, the quantity it supports assumes the eigenvalue b, but now the
quantity associated with ̂A is undefined.
This is of course the Heisenberg principle. It is appropriate to stress that
there is nothing mysterious, exotic or peculiar to quantum physics in this. It has
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simply been stated, in a refined and mathematically precise way, the fact that
anybody may be standing or seated, but nobody may simultaneously be standing
and seated.
3. The EPR paradox
In their thought experiment EPR consider a couple of particles moving in opposite
directions and so prepared that their total momentum is zero. If we measure the
momentum of one of them we know the momentum of the other without measuring
it. Now if we determine the position of the second particle, we end up knowing
both position and momentum of one and the same object, thus contradicting the
Heisenberg principle.
Actually performed experiments use rather pairs of objects prepared in a sin-
glet state or photons emitted in an SPS atomic transition, so that their spins are
antiparallel (first case) or polarization vectors equal (second case). Once the two
objects are well separated one from the other each of them is tested, using an
appropriate analyser, for the spin component or polarization state along a given
direction. Now using the EPR argument, if the measurements are performed along
different directions (for instance orthogonal directions) we conclude that the spin
components or polarization states of one object along different directions can be
simultaneously determined, in one case by direct measurement and in the other
by a counterfactual but (apparently) sound inference.
The week point in this is the idea of ”element of reality” (to use EPR’s words)
whose value is being tested or inferred. Einstein (and many others after him)
think of the experimentally testable properties of a quantum system as being
things carried around by the system: they are objectively there, measure them
or not. Now this idea appears to be in contrast with experience, because of the
”paradoxes” it generates.
Actually the situation is different. We may think that a quantum object (which
is well defined and existent, independently from the fact of being under measure-
ment or not) carries its properties as an ”instructions kit” telling it what to do
when encountering a measuring apparatus or in general undergoing an interaction
with something else.
In Aspect’s experiments the two photons, at the act of separating, receive,
each of them, their ”instructions” (whose content depends on the way they are
prepared). When they meet an analyser they behave accordingly: the realism is
save and Einstein’s locality is save too. If the two objects meet two experimental
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sets of the same kind so are the results (in case of spin components, they may have
the same or opposite sign, depending on the initial preparation). If however one
of the members of the pair is led to interact with a different type of apparatus,
its ”instruction card” tells it to behave differently.
Now the counterfactual inference that, in the EPR argument, lead to the
”paradox” tells us what the object under attention would have done if it had been
subjected to an experiment different from the one actually performed; nothing
more then this. Our quantum object possesses nothing else than its unique and not
contradictory ”instructions kit”: no two incompatible behaviours can be adopted
in the same time. The Heisenberg principle is save.
This way of reading things dissolves the EPR paradox and has no particular
subtlety in it; furthermore it is neither particularly exotic nor confined to the
quantum domain.
To express ideas of the same kind as those presented in this paper Accardi
uses a [simpatica] metaphor: that of the chameleons [8]. A chameleon is a well
defined non quantum ”object” which has the property of assuming the colour of
the support on which it rests. Now suppose you have a pair of twin chameleons and
separate them far away one from the other, then put one of them on a leaf: it will
become green. We can conclude, without experiment, that the second chameleon,
if it had been put on a leaf, it would have become green too, not certainly that
it is green. Actually suppose somebody puts the second chameleon on a trunk:
it will become brown. Nobody, knowing the result of both experiments, would
conclude that the second chameleon is green and brown at the same time. The
point is that the chameleon does not possess a colour, but the capacity to assume
a colour according to the environment in which it is laid. Everybody will agree:
1) that the chameleons are perfectly real and existing at any moment; 2) that the
phenomenon we verified is purely local; 3) that there is no logical contradiction
to be accounted for.
There is no reason that what is true for chameleons (or other classical and
macroscopic systems) cannot be true for electrons or photons. On the contrary
there are good reasons it to be true for them also.
4. Bell inequality
The Bell inequality has been considered as being a cornerstone in the understand-
ing of the nature and properties of quantum objects and phenomena. This concept
has been rather emphatically expressed in the statement by Stapp that Bell’s is
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”the most profound discovery of science” [9].
Bell originally applied his analysis to the EPR experiment. Maybe the clearest
way to expound it is to consider the Aspect’s version of that experiment. The
core of the argument moves from the results of three sets of measurements, two
being actually performed and the third being inferred on the basis of the original
preparation of the pair of objects being tested. The procedure is rather idealized
and the physical quantities and features of the experiment are so devised that the
issues of each of the three actual or hypothetical measurements (let us call them
a, b and c) may only be ±1. Everything then rests on the identity [10]:
a (b− c) ≡ ± (1− bc) (4.1)
Repeating the experiment many times, then considering statistical averages of
the results one arrives at
|〈ab〉 − 〈ac〉| ≤ 1− 〈bc〉 (4.2)
which is the Bell inequality.
Using quantum mechanics to evaluate the averages one sees both by calculation
(as Bell himself did) and by experiment (Aspect and coworkers) that in some
situations (4.2) is violated.
Now, according to Bell and to many people after him, the only hypotheses
underlying identity (4.1) are:
a) realism
b) determinism (4.3)
c) locality
Since (4.1) proves to be false and (4.2) violated, at least one of the hypotheses, it
is said, must be false too. The one usually doomed to be abandoned is the third,
i.e. locality (often called Einstein locality). This introduces action at a distance
and consequently violates the principle of relativity forcing people to formulate
various kinds of arguments intended to demonstrate that the action at a distance
is actually there but cannot really be used to transmit informations at a speed
higher than that of light.
Actually however there is a fourth hidden (to say better: not declared) hy-
pothesis underlying Bell’s reasoning: it is the assumption that the property being
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measured is something possessed as such by the quantum object and being there
at any moment. This means that, even if, say, a and c, on one side, b and c, on the
other, cannot be measured simultaneously, provided a rule exists enabling us to
guess what the result had been if c had been measured instead of a (or c instead
of b), we are entitled to use both a and c (or b and c) at the same time in (4.1).
The situation is different if we think quantum objects as carrying, so to speak,
recipe books rather than cakes, as said in the previous section. A recipe produces
a cake only when the right kitchen and ingredients are met and it has no meaning
to correlate a cake (= result of a measurement) with a recipe different from the
one being used. Out of metaphor, identity (4.1) is now deprived of sense and so
is the ensuing inequality (4.2). The logic of recipe books is different from the one
of cakes.
There is nothing strange in this, nor peculiar to the quantum world, as Ac-
cardi’s chameleons show, and all three conditions (4.3) are fully satisfied.
5. Conclusion
Since the very beginning quantum mechanics subverted deeply rooted ways of
thinking and mental [abitudini]. This involved its phenomena and theory in a
halo of mystery, giving rise to a decades long debate and a host of different in-
terpretations of quantum phenomena calling into play free will, the consciousness
of the experimenter and things like that. Now that the shock of the subversion
of the bald programs of the XIX century physics is far behind us, a quiet recon-
sidering of some of the ”strange” behaviours of quantum objects shows that they
are neither really that strange nor confined to the quantum world. An example
is the famous EPR paradox which is indeed no paradox, provided we accept that
the state of a quantum objects is defined by what I called an ”instruction kit”
or a ”recipe book”. In other words, the spin or the polarization are a behaviour
while interacting rather than a colour or a label attached to a particle.
Looking at things from this viewpoint, we see that realism, determinism and
localism are generally satisfied conditions (as we reasonably expect) and that
some features of the quantum phenomena may again find their counterpart in the
macroscopic domain.
This does not mean that everything is clear and solved with quantum mechan-
ics: the meaning of the wave function, its collapse, the quantization of the objects
it describes still escape our imagination and, at least in my case, our understand-
ing. Nonetheless we may claim that part of the mystery is only apparent and
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comes from a sort of long lasting prejudice.
In conclusion quantum measurements and the story of the violation of the Bell
or similar inequalities tell us that the objects of the quantum world are not like
boxes containing spin, polarization vector etc. like buttons, pins, pearls and the
like, but like programmed machines capable of different behaviours according to
the physical conditions locally triggering them. To mock the beautiful Accardi’s
metaphor I would say that the quantum particles are ”camleons” rather than
”boxons”.
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